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IETF RFC 9370 Multiple Key Exchanges in IKEv2 - Hybrid Post-Quantum Key Establishment for IPsec

RFC 9370, Multiple Key Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), is a Standards Track document of the Internet Engineering Task…

What IETF RFC 9370 Multiple Key Exchanges in IKEv2 - Hybrid Post-Quantum Key Establishment for IPsec requires

RFC 9370, Multiple Key Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), is a Standards Track document of the Internet Engineering Task Force published in May 2023 by CJ. Tjhai, M. Tomlinson, G. Bartlett, S. Fluhrer, D. Van Geest, O. Garcia-Morchon and V. Smyslov. It updates RFC 7296. It describes how to extend IKEv2 to allow multiple key exchanges to take place while computing a shared secret during a Security Association setup, which is the mechanism by which post-quantum key establishment is introduced into IPsec without abandoning the classical exchange. The problem it addresses is stated directly: IKEv2 as specified in RFC 7296 uses Diffie-Hellman or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman to establish a shared secret, it is believed that general-purpose quantum computers will be able to solve the underlying discrete logarithm problem, and this implies that the security of IKEv2 is compromised. The extension allows one or more post-quantum key exchanges to be performed alongside the classical exchange so that the final shared secret is computed from all of the component key exchange secrets; so that where both peers do not support and agree the additional exchanges, a shared secret equivalent to that specified in RFC 7296 is still obtained; and so that if any part of the component key exchange method is a post-quantum algorithm, the final shared secret is post-quantum secure. Mechanically, the specification utilises the IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange of RFC 9242 to carry the additional key exchanges, because post-quantum key exchange payloads may exceed the maximum transmission unit and IKE_SA_INIT has no inherent fragmentation support. It introduces a new exchange, IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE, registered as IKEv2 Exchange Type 44, for the same purpose when the IKE SA is being rekeyed or additional Child SAs are being created. Seven new Transform Types are registered, ADDKE1 through ADDKE7 with values 6 to 12, sharing the Transform ID space of Transform Type 4 so that additional exchanges may be either post-quantum or classical. It renames Transform Type 4 from Diffie-Hellman Group (D-H) to Key Exchange Method (KE), renames the Key Exchange Payload field from Diffie-Hellman Group Num to Key Exchange Method, and renames the corresponding IANA registry, generalising the key exchange algorithms usable in IKEv2. The stated main focus is preventing a passive harvest-and-decrypt attack; the specification is explicit that the authentication step remains classical and that other attacks involving an active attacker using a quantum computer are not completely solved by this document.

Pillar: Aviation, Defense & Quantum · Authority: Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), IP Security Maintenance and Extensions Working Group · Version: 1.0.0 · Last updated:

Primary source: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9370.html

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